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Abstract
Bioterrorisrn has been a threat to many cultures around the world for centuries. The first
record of their use dates back to 184 B.C. in a battle between Hannibal and King Eumenes of
Peranum. Within the past five years, the concern over biological weapons and bioterrorism has
greatly increased in the United States because of worldwide political dynamics. Is the United
States prepared for a bioterrorism attack? Is Minnesota prepared for an attack? These are
important questions, and many experts have not agreed upon the answers. Currently there is no
industry standard for hospitals in regards to bioterrorisrn preparedness. Utilizing data from a
survey of Minnesota hospitals conducted by the Minnesota Department of Health in 2002, this
study compared rural and urban hospitals in Minnesota and their level of bioterrorisrn
preparedness. Frorn the data, no overall statistical difference was found between rural and urban
hospitals. It became clear, however, that there existed a need for improved preparedness in all
Minnesota hospitals. Additionally, there was a need for an industry standard for minimal
preparedness and the resources to help hospitals attain and maintain that level of preparedness.
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Chapter One: Introduction
There are different views regarding the need for our country, specifically our
health care system, to prepare for biological weapon attacks. How prepared we should be
is an important question that should not be ignored. The reality of the world confronts us
everyda/, ter:rorist attacks abroad and now at home affect the way we live our lives.
\ilfhat are the best uses of our nation's limited resources, especially in the health care
industry? Should we put money into fighting terrorism directly or should we to try to
prevent terorisrn at its roots? Should we build our defenses at home? In preparing
ourselves, do we decrease our risk of attack? Is it right to put money into defenses for an
attack that may never occur? How likely is it that an attack will occur? These questions
involve both personal beliefs and political views. There is no way to be certain of the
right course to follow because we cannot predict the future.
Sorne experts feel that preparedness is a waste of limited resources. Cohen, Sidel
and Gould (2001) believe that the need for preparedness is not a given. In an era of tight
budgets, preparedness for an attack that rnay not occur is a "dangerous diversion of
resources" (p-1423). They describe the call for preparedness as an unnecessary return to
an era of fear that accornpanied the cold war. They believe preparedness prograrns could
do more harm than good by taking away from prograrns that deal with the health care
problerns the country is facing right now. They claim that the money would be better
spent on preventing terrorism rather than on the worst possible outcome. However, rnany
believe otherwise, thinking that all of our hospitals, rural as well as urban, need sorne
level of preparedness for bioterrorist attacks. Margaret Hamburg (2002), vice president
for Biological Programs at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, argues that to effectively
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respond to a hioterrorist attack will require quick recognition and subsequent action at the
local, state and federal levels. Dr. Ken Alibek (1999), forrner deputy chief of the Russian
bioweapons facility Biopreparat, claims that a rapid response is pivotal in decreasing the
number of casualties from a bioterrorist attack. He believes health care providers may
have as little as one hour to detect and contain a deadly agent before the situation
becornes uncontrollable.
The risk of an attack is unknown, and likely relatively low for any specific area.
However, the risk exists, and the potential consequences from not preparing are
catastrophic. This is demonstrated in an estimate from the United States Congressional
Office of Technology Assessment, stating that from a single release of 100 kg of anthrax,
between 130,000 and 3 million deaths could occur in a given area (Ingleshy et a1., 2002).
The threats to the United States (U.S.) from around the world and at home are
real. Most Americans know this painfully from the September 11,2001 attacks on the
World Trade Center and Pentagon and the anthrax letters in the following months. Jones,
Terndrup, Franz and Eitzen (2002) call these acts, ilsymmerric attacks. This type of
attack is perforrned by a nation or non-state actor using biological weapons or other
atypical weapons because they cannot fight equally with larger nations such as the U. S.
Asymmetric attacks are popular with terrorist groups because they level the playing field
and virtually anyone can produce the weapons needed.
Jessica Stern (1999), author of The Ultimate Terrorisr, writing for Emerging
Infectious Diseases, stated that there are currently three trends fostering bioterrorism.
First, more terrorist groups are willing to take the political risk related to massively
destructive events. Second, the availability of biological agents has increased. Finally,
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the nature of the groups allows them to remain in secrecy. Simon (1997 , p.428)
summarizes fhe risk, "The first step is to accept the reality that we will not he able to
prevent every act of BW [biological weapons) terrorisfir." Michael Osterholm (Osterholm
& SchwffiE,2000, p. 188), forrner Minnesota State Epidemiologist, in his book Living
Terrors, states, "Whateverwe do, America will remain a uniquely compelling target for
terrorists. But our lack of preparedness doubtless heightens our vulnerability to bioterror
attack." These threats apply to everyofle. Even Minnesotans are not immune from the
possibility of attack. In 1995, two mernbers of a Minnesota militia group tried to use a
homemade biological toxin, ricin, to retaliate against local government officials (Danzig
& Berkowsky, 1997). According to the U.S. Office of Technological Assessment, in
1995 there were at least 17 countries believed to have biological weapons. The countries
included: Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, China, North Korea, South Korea, Egypt, Vietnam,
Laos, Cuba, Bulgaria, India, South Africa, Russia, Israel, and Taiwan (A1ibek, 1999).
The political nature of many of these countries such as Iraq and North Korea rnakes the
fact that they may have biological weapons more significant.
What would a bioterrorism attack look like? Would it be obvious to those being
attacked? D. A. Henderson (1999), professor at Johns Hopkins University and forrner
director of the World Health Organization's (WHO) prograrn to end smallpox, described
a potential biological attack, "The release could be silent and would almost certainly be
undetected. The cloud would be invisible, odorless and tasteless" {p.1279). The agent
could spread through an area without detection for days. It would likely not be
discovered until patients became ill and visited their local health care provider or
Emergency Department (ED) with an illness that few people are trained to recognize.
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What needs to be done to become prepared is debatable, but many experts agree
on the basic principles of preparedness. Schultz, Mothershead and Field (2002) described
the fundamental aspects of bioterrorisrn preparedness as including a well-rehearsed plan,
training and education, expansion plans for a surge of patients, knowing when and how to
activate the plan and the use of an incident cornmand systern. The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) emphasized areas of preparedness through program
funding between 1999 and 2001. These areas included planning, surveillance, improved
laboratory capacity, and training (Meyer & Morse, 2002).
In the small amount of work that has been performed on bioterrorism (BT)
preparedness, results show a lack of preparedness. Wetter, Daniell and Treser (2001,
p.710) found in their study of hospitals that they "are not prepared in an organized
fashion to treat victims of chemical or biological terrorism." In a survey mailed to 61
different Ernergency Departments in the Philadelphia area in June and July of 2000,
Greenburg, Jurgens and Gracely (2002) found "the overall level of preparedness for
hospital EDs responding to this survey was low..."(p. 273). Within Minnesota, there is
less inforrnation regarding the level of preparedness. Currently, there are no published
articles regarding the current ability of hospitals statewide to handle BT events.
How prepared is Minnesota? How prepared are it's coilununities for a BT attack?
Society is very mobile today, with people driving farther to work each duy. There are
numerous cofirrrluters traveling from rural to urban areas everyday. The mobility that
many enjoy puts the entire state at risk for bioterrorism, not just urban areas. Are the
resources going towards preparedness in just the urban areas because more people live
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there? The key question of this study is: how prepared are rural hospitals compared to
urban hospitals in Minnesota for bioterrorist attacks?
Background to studY
The use of biological agents as weapons dates back to 184 B.C. Preparing for a
naval battle with King Eumenes of Peranum, Hannibal ordered his troops to fill clay pots
with snakes and serpents. During the battle, Hannibal's soldiers threw the pots onto King
Eumenes, ships, causing the enemy to deal with an additional threat, and subsequently
leading to their defeat (Noah, Huebner, Darling & Waeckerle, 2002)' During the Middle
Ages, the Tartars surrounded the city of Kaffa. At the time of the affack, Tartar soldiers
were being affected by the plague. In an attempt to tum this to their favor, soldiers were
ordered to catapult cadavers into the city of Kaffa (Christopher, Cieslak, Pavlin & Eitzen,
1997).
Smallpox has been used many times historically as a biological weapon. During
the French and Indian Wars of 1754- 1767 , Sir Jeffery Amherst gave blankets
contaminated with srnallpox to native Indians loyal to France. The result was the fall of
Fort Carillon into English hands (Christopher et a1., 1997). Srnallpox was also used
against Native Americans in the Ohio Region. In 1763, Captain Ecuyer of Fort Pitt gave
srnallpox contaminated gifts of blankets and a handkerchief to unknowing Indians,
fearing their potential attack (Noah et al. ,2AOZ)'
During the 1970's, covert assassinations were carried outusing a powerful toxin
called ricin, which is made from caster beans. The toxin was put into 1.7 rnm metal
pellets with a hole driiled through them. The pellet was covered with a wax that would
melt at body temperature, These pellets were 
o'shot" from spring-loaded umbrellas and
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were successfully used in the assassination of Georgi Markov, a Bulgarian defector, and
were tried again in an atternpt on Vladamir Kostov, another defector (Christopher et al.,
te97).
In the fall of 1984, in a small community in Oregon calledThe Dalles,75l people
were intentionally infected with Salmonella. On two separate occasions, followers of an
Indian guru named Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh intentionally infected the salad bars at local
restaurants with Salmonetta typhimurium. Patrons of 10 different restaurants contracted
the gastroenteritis-causing bacteria and became ill. During the crirninal investigation, it
was discovered that members of the religious cofirnune had infected the patrons in an
apparent attempt to affect local elections (Torok et al. ,1997).
A well-publicized attack was carried out in March of 1995 by the religious cult
Aurn Shinrikyo, Members of the cult intentionally released sarin, a powerful nerve gas,
into the Tokyo subway systern. This attack resulted in 5500 visits to health care
facilities, with over 1000 of the victirns requiring hospitalization and 12 fatalities (Noah
et al., 2002). The attack was carried out using umbrellas to punch holes into plastic jugs
filled with sarin gas. In the following investigation it was revealed that the cult was also
trying to create biological weapons frorn Ctostridium botultnum, Bacillus anthracis and
the Ebola virus. At the time of the attack, the cult had approxirnately 50,000 rnembers
worldwide with assets of $1.4 billion (Osterholm & Schwartz, 2000).
In 199d at a Texas rnedical center, doughnuts and muffins intentionally laced with
Shigetla dysenteriae were anonymously left in a break room. Twelve staff members
became ill with severe diarrhea. It was believed the bacteria likely carne from the
hospital's stock cultures (Kolavic et al., 1997).
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Question to be answered
What is the level of preparedness for bioterrorist attacks in Minnesota hospitals in
counties with populations under 50,000 people compared to counties with populations
over 50,000?
Purpose of the study
No formal studies suryeying Minnesota hospital preparedness for BT have been
published to date. Because of the risks related to and the nafure of bioterrorism, it is
important for all hospitals in Minnesota to have some level of preparedness. An attack is
possible anywhere in the U. S. As Osterholrn & Schwartz (2000) point out, certain areas
are atmore risk than others, such as airports or large malls. Because of their design, they
allow easy access to thousands of people who could spread an agent throughout the
country. We live in a mobile society where an individual can be in the Chicago airport in
the morning and home in a rural Minnesota farming cofirmunity that evening. If this
person is contaminated with a BT agent, they could possibly spread the infection to
everyone he or she encounters, including their family and coworkers. The disease could
spread until the problem was large enough to move into a "prepared" area and be
correctly diagnosed and Eeated. It does not work to protect certain areas when all areas
are so easily connected. It is important to understand the current level of preparedness
for bioterrorisrn in Minnesota hospitals because critical improvements are likely needed.
This information may help hospitals and policy makers to understand what the local and
regional issues are for preparedness.
Bioterrorism Preparedness I
Definition of terms
Biological Terrorism (BT): a terrorist act that uses a biological weapon to cause mass
physical harm or death.
Biory.eapons / Bio-Weapons (BW): any weapon that incorporates a biological agent or
disease (such as anthrax or botulism toxin) as an integral part of its destructive capability.
Chemical Weap_on: any weapon that incorporates a chemical agent (such as sarin gas) as
an integral part of its destructive capability-
HAZMAT: hazardous material
Rural: a population in a defined area (e.g. a county) under 50,000 people.
Terrorism: the FBI has defined terrorisrn as ". . . the unlawful use of force or violence
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a governrnent, the civilian population,
or any segrnent thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." (Osterholm &
Schwartz, 2000, p. 31)
Urban: a population in a defined area (e.g. a county) that is over 50,000 people-
Wgapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): any weapon such as a biological weapon,
chernical weapon or nuclear device that is intended to cause massive rnortality and
morbidity.
Communication: courmunication capabilities and protocols for information exchange
with the puhlic and local, state and federal authorities.
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Facitity Drills: participation in bioterrorism drills and exercises.
patient Isolation: the use of hospital space to adequately isolate patients with a
cortmunicable illness.
personnel M.anagemeqt: plans for augmentation of personnel, including credentialing and
supervi sion of non-facility healthcare providers -
plapning: the presence of plans and protocols for dealing with a bioterrorism scenario.
protective Measures: the availability of vaccines, pharmaceuticals and personal
protection equipment for patients and healthcare workers-
Staff Training: current level of training and accsss to training for healthcare workers.
As s umptions and limitations
preparedness for chemical attacks was not addressed in this study because such
attacks create a scenario that would not put the hospital as the likely first responder to the
attack. As Khan, Levitt and Sage (2000) discuss, chemical attacks are more likely to be
overt because the effects of chemical agents are known immediately. In a chemical
attack scenario, a scene response team, such as Metropolitan Medical Response Teams
(MMRT), with on-site decontamination capabilities, would be more appropriate than
delayed decontamination and treatrnent at a hospital. Many of the present laws such as
the Nunn-Luger-Domencini Amendment in 1997 , have created rapid response teams such
as the MMRT and others to deal with these attacks (Henderson, 1999). In addition, many
hospitals already have hazardous material or chemical protocols in place in response to
private and industrial use of chemicals. In short, hospital preparedness for chemical
agents is an area that has some level of preparedness currently in place. Also, inclusion
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of chemical weapons preparedness would have created a sfudy too broad to focus on
adequately.
The original survey inquired about the hospital's capability to respond to a
bioterrorist attack. It is assumed that the person/persons who completed the original
survey had adequate knowledge of the facility and were able to accurately describe the
facilities capabilities and limitations. In addition, it was assumed that the original
surveys were filled out truthfully, reflecting the facilities current level of preparedness
and not it's projected level. Reporting bias of respondents may have caused a higher
level of preparedness to be reported than what was actually in place.
This study was limited to the number of facilities that returned the requested
information. It is not a true population study because all hospitals in Minnesota were not
asked to participate. The study was also limited by the questions and categories covered
in the original survey, the Hospital Assessment Survey for Biological Emergencies- The
original suruey may not have adequately covered all areas of preparedness, nor allowed
accurate response options to reflect current preparedness levels.
The following chapters will review t}re history of BT from its origins to current
threats. The methods used in gathering the data frorn the Hospital Assessment Surtey for
Biological Emergencies will be explained along with the results of that data. Biological
terrorism is a complicated subject matter that has been in existence for hundreds of years.
In today's complicated political climate, BT has become a dangerous tlreat that should
be addressed in one way or another. To face this threat we need to understand what the
threat is as well as our current capability to face that threat to know if and where
irnprovements need to be made. There currently is insufficient published data regarding
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the ability of Minnesota hospitals to face the threat of BT. This sfudy looks to add
information to the field of BT preparedness and aid in the understanding of what needs to
be accomplished in Minnesota hospitals for them to becorne as prepared for BT as
possible.
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Chapter Two: Review of Literature
Introduction
After review of various databases, including PubMed, WebMD and MedlinePlus,
information related to bioterrorisrn preparedness in hospitals is summarized below.
Keywords searched were: bioterrorism, bioterrorism and preparedness, bioterrorisrn
preparedness, biological terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, hospital preparedness'
hospital preparedness for bioterrorism, local preparedness for bioterrorism.
The following are major contributors to the field of bioterrorisrn preparedness:
D. A. Henderson is a professor at Johns Hopkins University. He directed the
World Health Organization's (WHO) global eradication of smallpox form 1966-1977,
helped initiate the WHO's global imrnunization program in I974, and was deputy
assistant secretary and senior science advisor in the Department of Health and Human
Services. He has been active in educating the world about the threat of bioterrorism
through numerous articles'
Dr. Ken Alibek, formerly Kanatjan Alibekov, was born in Kazakhstan in 1950
and trained to become a physician in the Russian army. He eventually gained PhDs in
microbiology and biotechnology. He was deputy chief of the Russian bioweapons
facility Biopreparar from 1988-1992. In 1992 he defected to the U. S. and has shed light
on the extent of the Russian bioweapons program, testifying before Congress numerous
times.
Michael Osterholm, former Minnesota State Epiderniologist, is a recognized
leader around the world in the field of infectious diseases. He was the personal advisor to
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the late King Hussein of Jordan and is now the director of the Center for Infectious
Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota.
Agents
Biological attacks may be noticed in one of two ways. Recognition of the
symptoms related to a potential biological weapon is the basis for syndrome-based
criteria. Waiting for laboratory confirmation in certain instances, such as a smallpox
attack, may not be practical in the isolation and treatment of some bioweapon diseases.
The second way an attack may come to light is through epidemiologic features . Certain
epiderniologic presentations may indicate a covert BT attack, such as a rapid increase in
patients with fever, respiratory or gasffointestinal problems @nglish et a1., 2002)-
The CDC has categorized potential biological weapons agents into three
categories (A, B and C) based on ease of transmission or dispersal and the threat to public
health. Category A agents are the top priority and are considered a threat to national
security. These agents are: anthrax(Bacitlus anthracfs), botulism (Clostridiumbotulinum
toxin), plague (Yersinia pestis), smallpox {Variola maior), tularemia (Francisella
tularensis) and viral hernorrhagic fevers (English, et al., 2OAZ). Of these agents,
Henderson (1999) states that anthrax and smallpox currently pose the greatest and most
likely threat. In 1994, Anatoliy Vorobyov, a Russian bioweapons scientist, inforrned the
National Academy of Sciences that Russian scientists felt smallpox was the most likely
agent for BT attacks, followed by anthrax and plague (Henderson, 1998).
The history and threats associated with anthrax and smallpox are more widely
documented than the other four Category A agents on the CDC's list. This is likely due
to the fact that they are thought to be the most likely agents used and potentially the most
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dangerous. This fact alone could make the other agents such as bofulisrn and plague
rnore attractive to terrorist groups because of their designation as unexpected agents'
However, with the ease of transmission, ease of attainment and high fatality rates
associated with anthrax and smallpox, they still rernain the most feared and most likely
agents used by terrorist groups. A review specific to these two diseases follows.
Smallpox- Between rhe years 1901 and 2001, nearly 500 million people have died
frorn srnallpox. This is more than from all war-related deaths, the Spanish Flu of 19tB
and all AIDS related deaths combined in the same time period (Osterhokn & Schwartz,
2000). Smallpox is so contagious that in the past, separate hospitals have been used for
isolation of smallpox patients due to its cornmunicable nature (Hetrderson, Inglesby, et
al., 1999).
In aerosolized forrn, smallpox can survive for 24 hours and is highly infectious in
srnall quantities. There are an estirnated 10 secondary cases for each index case of
smallpox (Henderson, 1999). In rnodeling a smallpox attack with 100 initial victims,
Meltzer, Darnon, [,eDuc and Miller (2001) showed that it would take up to one fulI year
for a combination of vaccination and quarantine to end the outbreak. Additionally, from
the initial 100, approximately 4200 cases of smallpox would result if all rneasures to
contain the outbreak were taken immediately. From the 4200 subsequent cases, at least
1260 people, or 3OTo,would have a fatal outcome (Henderson et a1-, 1999).
The capacity of smallpox to spread has heen shown in two specific outbreaks. In
Germany in 19?0, an electrician became ill shortly after traveling to Pakistan- He was
soon diagnosed with smallpox, hospitalized and isolated in a special hospital designed to
house patients with corrmunicable diseases. From his infection, 19 cases of smallpox
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occurred, within a population of well-vaccinated citizens (Wehrle, Posch, Richter &
Henderson, 1970). In Yugoslavia in 1972, from one index case, 1 1 friends and family
mernbers became ill. Their physicians did not diagnose the initial illnesses as srnallpox
until four weeks after the first person becarne i11. At that point, 150 people were infected
with the virus. The country launched a control campaign resulting in the vaccination of
twenty million people. In addition, 10,000 people were isolated and held under military
guard for two weeks. In the end, 175 cases were confirmed with 35 fatalities (Henderson,
1 e98).
The U. S. stopped vaccinating people against srna1lpoxinlgT2. According to the
U.S. Census Bureau(n.d. , Age: 2000. Retrieved November 3,2002), approximately 42Vo
or 1tB rnillion of the U. S. population is under the age of 30 and have not been vaccinated
for srnallpox. O'Toole, Mair, & Inglesby (2002, p. 4) described the level of immunity
that carries through to today by stating, "an estimated 228 million U.S. citizens would be
expected to be highly susceptible to smallpox infection." Henderson (1999) estimated
that117o or less of the population is protected against smallpox. With the advent of a
vaccine, historically, an average of 2155 vaccines wsre given for each case of smallpox.
This would indicate that a supply of 40 million doses would be needed to cover one
outbreak of smallpox (Meltzer, Damon, LeDuc & Miller, 2001). The U. S. currently
holds 15.4 million doses of srnallpox vaccine through the CDC (O'Toole et al.).
Srnallpox has an insidious onset. After l2-L4 days of incubation the victirn will
initially develop symprorns such as high fever and malaise. The prodrome is followed by
a rash, which becomes vesicular, then pustular. It is at this stage that patients transrnit the
virus to those around them. These patients will need isolation suites with negative
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airflow or need to be isolated in separate facilities. Mortality, often due to toxemia from
circulating irnmune/antigen cornplexes, is approximately SOVo and usually occurs two
weeks after the onset of illness. At this time, there are no effective treatrnents other than
supportive therapy along with antibiotics as needed for secondary infections (Henderson
et a1., 1999).
Currently there are two repositories for the smallpox virus that are sanctioned by
the World Health Organization. One of them is in Koltsovo, Novosibirsk at the Russian
State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology. The other is in the U. S., at the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, GA (Henderson, 1999). These are
the only facilities that are legally allowed to contain and perforrn research on the
smallpox virus.
Anthrax. Anthrax is a disease caused by B. anthraci,s, a naturally occurring
bacteria that typically affects herbivores. Humans may becorne infected with anthrax in
three different ways, via cutaneous, gastrointestinal or inhalational routes. The usual
route for human infection is through cutaneous contact with an infected anirnal or animal
product that is contaminated with the bacteria. Cutaneous contact usually manifests as a
black skin lesion. With antibiotic teatrnent, mortality is rare. Gastrointestinal anthrax is
relatively rare, with few reported cases to draw information from. It cornes from the
ingestion of under-cooked meat infected with the bacteria. Mortality is estimated to be
similar to that of inhalational anthrax. Inhalational anthrax is the most serious of the
three, with a mortality rate of almost9OTo. Between the years 1900 and 1976, there were
only J.8 cases of inhalational anthrax reported in the U. S- The illness has two stages.
The first, lasting hours to days, presents with vague symptorns such as fever, cough,
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headache, vomiting and chest pain. The second stage comes with the sudden onset of
fever, sweating, difficulty breathing and shock. Almost one half of patients affected will
develop hemorrhagic rneningitis with eventual delirium and obtundation (Inglesby et a1.,
2002).
Anthrax is relatively easy to produce and is very stable in its desiccated form.
The danger of inhalational anthrax came to light in an incident at a Russian bioweapons
factory in Sverdlovsk in1979. From an accidental release of anthrax spores,77 people
contracted the illness and 66 of them died (Noah et al. 2OOZ). It was estimated that the
release of an amount as small as a few milligrarns of aerosolized anthrax could have
caused the illnesses at the factory (Meselson et al. ,1994). A release of anthrax spores,
such as an attack or the factory incident, would be invisible, odorless and able to travel
several kilometers before it would no longer be a threat (Inglesby et a1., 2OOZ).
In the fall of 2001, on the east coast of the U.S., an unknown party rnailed letters
containing B. anthracis to various locations. This attack resulted in22 cases of anthrax,
of which 11 were cutaneous cases and 11 were inhalation cases. Of the 1l-inhalation
patients, five died. The Aurn Shinrikyo cult, the group responsible for the 1994 Tokyo
subway sarin attacks, reportedly tried to disperse anthrax and bohrlism at least eight
different tirnes in Tokyo (Inglesby et al., 2002).
The average time between onset of symptorns and death is three days. With this
rate of infection, early administration of antibiotics is pivotal. Currently the only
medications approved by the FDA for inhalation anthrax are penicillin, doxycycline and
ciprofloxacin (Inglesby et a1.,2002). The fatality rate of inhalational anthrax is over SOTo
(Henderson, L999) and cases have been reported to occur between two and 43 days after
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exposure to B. anthracis spores. Optimal protection against the disease for exposed
individuals is thought to be vaccination with the anthrax vaccine and co-adrninistration of
antibiotics for 60 days. Prophylactic vaccination has been used by the arrned forces. The
anthrax vaccine has questionahle safety, however, and current stocks in the U.S. are too
lirnited to be used widely. Therefore, currently the best treatment for exposure is the
administration of antibiotics (Inglesby et a1.).
Threats
Noah et al. (2OOZ) describe that the viability of a threat stems frorn a combination
of the ability of a country or terrorist to produce an effective weapon, the mindset or
intent to use that weapon and the target's vulnerability to that weapon. According to
Michael Osterholm (2000), a successful biological weapons laboratory could be set up in
anyone's basernent using equipment from a high school or college lab and supplies that
are available through catalogs. This is in agreement with Danzig and Berkowsky's
{1997) clairn that an inexpensive, effective weapon could he created by virtually anyone
with a background in biology. They stated that there are even plans and recipes for
biological weapons on the Internet. Osterholm & Schwartz (2000) discussed the variety
of current threats, stating that they may come from countries such as lraq, terrorist groups
such as Al Qaeda or lone wolf or cowboy terrarists such as Timothy McVeigh or Ted
Kaczynski. In 1997, the FBI filed 2l bioterrorist threats; in 1999, the number had
increased to 187 (Noah et al., 2002).
It takes rnore than a deadly organism to create a biological weapon. Zilinskas
(1997) described a biological weapon as four parts that need to work smoothly
together-the payload (the organism or agent), the container that houses and protects the
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organisrn (munitions), the method of delivery (rocket, airplane, etc.) and the mechanism
to spread the payload (sprayer, an explosion, etc.). Simon (1997) stated that the most
likely rnethod of a hiological attack would be through aerosolization of an agent, such as
anthrax or bonrlism spores. A deadly but stable cloud of microscopic particles would be
created. This could be accomplished using crop dusters, trucks with spray tanks, or small
canisters, which could be placed anywhere and are timed to release the agents. Using an
explosive device to deliver the spores would destroy much of the payload, making such a
weapon less effective. In 1993, the Office of Technological Assessment released a report
stating that a small airplane spreading 100 kg of anthrax would be rnore deadly than a
missile carrying a hydrogen bomb (Office of Technology Assessment, 1993). The
anthrax could potentially kill one to three rnillion people in a 300 square rnile area around
Washington D.C. (Osterholm & Schwartz, 2000).
After the fall of Russia, rnany truths came to light in regard to their bioweapons
programs. The largest facility, called Vector, was located in Koltsovo, Novsibirsk.
It encompassed 30 buildings and employed up to 4000 people. The facility worked with
srnallpox, Marburg, Ebola and other hemorrhagic viruses trying to turn them into
weapons (Henderson, 1999). At one point in 1990, the facility was capable of creating
nearly one hundred tons of srnallpox per year (A1ibek, 1999). With the breakdown of the
Russian system, there has been a migration of scientific knowledge regarding biological
weapons. Dr. Alibek (1999) claims in his hook Biohazardthathe has personally heard of
five former Russian bioweapons scientists now working in han, a country feared to have
an active biological warfare program (Noah et al., 2A0!). Henderson et al. (1999) stated
that there were rising concerns about the spread of rnaterials and knowledge from
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Russian facilities into foreign hands due to massive cutbacks in funding for Russian
laboratories. Currently in Russia, hiological weapons are available for sale to anyone
wanting to buy them. A company in Moscow called Bioeffekt Ltd. offers three different
strains of tularernia for sale (Alibek, 1999). This is an agent the CDC defines as a
category A agent, one that could threaten national security. In 1998, there were roughly
450 repositories of various biological agents worldwide, of which over 50 sold anthrax,
34 sold botulism producing bacteria and 18 sold plague bacteria (Osterholm & Schwartz,
2000).
Dr. Osterholm shared his view regarding the anthrax letters sent in October 2001
in an open forum discussion at the University of Minnesota (Osterholm & Miller, 2002).
He said the frightening aspect of the anthrax letters was the fact that the perpetrator(s)
have not been caught. It is not known if it was someone within the U.S. or a foreign actor
who had carried out these attacks. To rnake the situation worse, in all likelihood the
attackers have more anthrax remaining. He stated, o'A person does not rnake just one
cookie, they make a whole batch." In an article frorn the Washington Post (Gugliotta and
Matsumoto, 2002, p. ,{6), experts voiced their belief that it would require the resources of
a country and not a lone attacker to carry out the anthrax letter attacks of the fall of 2001.
With the resolution of the Gulf 'War, rnernbers of the Iraqi rnilitary admitted to
creating a bioweapons program. They acknowledged producing Bacillus anthracis,
aflatoxin and the borulinum toxin, all to be used in bioweapons. Eight thousand liters of
anthrax were produced, of which 6000 liters were used to fill weapons. Twenty thousand
liters of botulism toxin were produced, 12,000 liters of which were used in weapons and
weapons testing. The haqi military deployed an arsenal includin E 25 SCUD missiles and
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200 bornbs, all containing either bofulinurn toxin, anthrax or aflatoxin. In addition, they
outfitted a MIG-21 fighter jet, piloted by rernote control, with a 22OA L storage tank and
spray mechanism (Zilinskas, L997). At the same open forum discussion with Dr. Michael
Osterholm, Judith Miller, a Pulitzer Prize winning colurnnist for the New York Times
and author of the bestselling book Germs, stated in regard to the kaqi leader Saddam
Hussein, "He does have biological and chemical agents... There is a large chance that he
would use these weapons" (Osterhokn & Miller,2OOZ).
History of Preparedness
Global. The first attempt at diplomatically confrolling biological weapons came
in 1925. It was through the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War
of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.
The protocol did allow for research and production of biological weapons, but did not
allow theiruse during war. It was not until 1975 that the U.S. finally ratified the Geneva
Protocol. The protocol did little to curb the propagation of biological weapons, however.
This was shown with Japanese biological weapons research between 7932 and 1945.
This research caused the death of 10,000 prisoners as they studied anthrax, the plague,
meningitis and other agents (Christopher et al., 1997).
In 1972, over 140 nations came together again to halt the proliferation of
biological weapons. This was part of the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Developrnent, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and
their Destruction, also called the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. The agreernent
was ratified by at least 140 of the participating countries. In 1975, the agreement went
into effect, however, it soon becarne clear that there were problems with the treaty.
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Monitoring and enforcement became problematic. Soon after ratification, Russia
knowingly began violating the agreernent via their civilian biological warfare
organization called "Biopreparat." Many other countries were suspected of doing the
same (Noah et al., 2002).
National. The initiation of an offensive bioweapons program in the U.S. came in
1942 at Camp Detrick, Maryland, with additional testing facilities in Mississippi and
Utah. At Camp Detrick, tests were conducted on Bacillus anthracis and Brucella suis.
Eventually 5000 bombs were filled with B. anthracis at Camp Detrick. In 1969,
President Nixon changed U.S. policy on biological weapons by terrninating the prograrns.
In addition, he initiated a defensive program that ultirnately became the U.S. Army
Medical Research Instinrk of Infectious Diseases or USAMRIID (Noah et a1., 2002).
In 1995, Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) was issued in response to
terrorist actions. The full document is classified, but reports say it addresses ways to stop
terrorist acts proactively and rnethods of responding to terrorist attacks. Critics, however,
describe the directive as unclear and not helpful in dealing with an actual crisis
(Osterholm & Schwartz,2000). In 1996, the U.S. governmentpassed a law that required
companies selling biological agents to check the identity of potential buyers to ensure
that the use was for research (Alibek, 1999). The FBI is in charge of crisis managernent
and investigation in relation to BT attacks within the U.S. As part of the Nunn-Lugsr-
Domencini Arnendment fi 1997, the Office of Ernergency Preparedness has trained
Metropolitan Medical Response Teams (MMRT) in 120 cities. These are teams of first
responders that can rapidly respond to a biological affack. Also, the National Guard is
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training 10 Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Teams with 22 ftrll-tirne mernbers
that are able to mobilize quickly to an affected area (Henderson, 1999).
In 2000, the U.S. government spent $8.4 billion on counter-terrorism programs, of
this, $315 million was spent in the U.S. for BT preparedness training. Of the $315
million, 67o or $18.9 million went to the public health systems across the country (Miller,
Engelberg & Broad,2002). In}O}Z,the CDC rnade available $918 million as part of its
Fublic Health Preparedness and Response for Bioterrorism prograrn" This money went
toward local, regional and interstate preparedness for bioterrorism (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 20OZ).
The CDC has also created a National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS) Program.
This program would supply vaccines, antibiotics and other rnedical supplies to any region
within the U.S. in case of an attack. These supplies are placed into lZ-hour Push
Packages that could arrive anywhere in the U.S. within 12 hours of notification. In
addition, a group of technical advisors called a Technical Advisory Response Unit will
accompany the first shiprnent. This program is in place and was activated with the
attacks on September 11,2001 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, n.d.).
There are cuffently 15.4 million doses of smallpox vaccine available in the U. S.
One hundred and fifty-five million new vaccine doses have been ordered by the
governrnent and were to be delivered in the fall of 2OOZ (Jones et al., 2OAZ).
The CDC is creating a national Laboratory Response Network (LRN) that will
allow for rapid referral and training. Hospital laboratories can becorne part of the LRN.
There are four levels of capabilities, A through D. Level A laboratories would have
general rule-out capabilities for most biological agents and are located in rnany hospitals.
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Laboratory capabilities increase as the level increases. Currently there are two
laboratories, level D, which are capable of Biosafety Level 4, with the highest level of
safety and detection. One is located at USAMRIID and the other is at the CDC's
National Center for Infectious Disease in Georgia (Jones et al., 2002). Regional
involvement in this network would be a key feafure in a region's preparedness.
Region. A series of comrnunity meetings addressing preparedness needs for
terrorism involving the Minnesota Hospital and Healthcare Partnership, Minnesota
Department of Health, Minnesota State Emergency Medical Services Regulatory Board
and Minnesota Local Public Health Association were conducted between December 2001
and January 20A2. In these rneetings, 4 number of areas for improvement were cited,
including training, corrmunication systerns, planning, command control, drills and
pharrnaceutical supplies (Minnesota Departrnent of Health, 2OO2) .
IrZOO2, the Minnesota Department of Health received $16 million from the CDC
for the preparedness needs of local and state public health agencies. These funds will be
used for preparedness assessment, surveillance capacity, laboratory capacity, public
information, training, comrnunications and the Health Alert Network (HAN). Over $5
million will be distributed to health departments at the local level (Minnesota Department
of Health Fact Sheet, 20OZa). Also in 2002, The Health Resources and Seruices
Administration (HRSA) gave the Minnesota Department of Health $2,155,835 for its
Hospital Bioterrorism Preparedness Program. This program divided the state into eight
regions. In each region, a plan rnust be developed to support a surge of 500 patients from
a BT attack (Minnesota Departrnent of Health Fact Sheet, 20AZW.
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Wlry hospitals are on the front lines
previous approaches to preparedness for terrorist attacks assumed that there
would be a "scene" to respond to and therefore a need for a response team. This was the
thinking behind much of the funding thus far for BT. The Nunn-Luger-Domencini
Arnendment supplied $50 million for training of on-scene first responder teams-
However, this type of funding may not help with response to a bioterrorist attack. Alibek
(1ggg, p. 283) describes one of the problems, "...it assumes an identifiable scene of
attack; biological weapons will most likely be deployed in secret and leave no trace."
Miller et al. (2002,p.237) point out that this type of first responder training is
.....worthless against anthrax or smallpox. In a gefln assault, there would be no 'scene' at
which experts could converge."
The rate of onset of illness is a major factor dictating whether hospitals will be the
first to receive victims of a BT attack" For a person exposed to a biological agent the
onset of illness is delayed, ranging from days to weeks. Depending on the agent used, the
distribution is potentially very wide with BT. Agents such as smallpox can be
transmitted person to person outside of the initial attack zone. The people who respond
first to a biological attack will he health-care workers in hospitals and emergency
departments (EDs). Victims will develop a severe illness and present to their local ED or
prirnary provider days to weeks after they were exposed to a biological agent (Osterholm
& Schwartz, 2000)-
Logistical factors also play a role in why hospitals should be relied on to be the
front line. Vaccines and antibiotics will be needed in mass quantities because of the
potential for 10 secondary cases of illness for each primary victim (Henderson, 1999). In
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addition, patient isolation rnay play an enorrnous role in mortality and morbidity for
biological weapons that afe coflrmunicable, such as smallpox and plague- Srnallpox is so
coilrmunicable that patients need isolation rooms with special airflow to limit the risk of
exposing more people (Henderson et a1., 1999).
In many of the articles published to date, there is agreement that hospitals will
likely be rhe flrst place victims of BT will be seen. According to Schultz et al. (2002)
and Henderson (1gg8), the ED and the emergency physician are key players in
recognition and management of victims in a bioterrorist event. They claimed that how
well a facility responds to an event such as BT depends on the level of preparedness of
the hospital and the sraff. Trear et al., (2001) and Miller et at. (2002) discussed similar
beliefs, clairning hospital physicians and nurses wilt likely be the first to encounter
victims of BT attacks due to the nature of biological agents. Finally, the CDC Srategic
planning Workgroup discussed that primary health providers will be the initial people to
see the effects of a BT attack and therefore should be prepared (Khan et a1.,2000).
Opposition
There are some who disagree with the philosophy of expending resources to
prepare for possible BT attacks. Sidel, Cohen and Gould (2001) discussed the possibility
that preparedness and research into preparedness could trigger another arms race, this
time in biological weapons. They say people are being misled by preparedness policies'
The risks right now are only hypothetical with no explicit data to support them. Sidel et
al. (2001, p- 716) state, "Preparedness does not make sense without an estimate of risk."
They clairn that other authors are over estimating the current level of risk of BT. In an
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article for the American lournat of Pubtic Health, Cohen, Gould and Sidel (1999)
estimated the risk of a catastrophic BT attack at next to zero.
Geiger (2001) add.resses current real costs in the U.S. as opposed to hypothetical
numbers concerning the possibility of BT. Currently, diseases stemrning from food-
borne illnesses have T6 million victirns and 5000 deaths per year. Chemical releases such
as spills or explosions result in 60,000 victims and cause over 300 deaths each year.
These are real problems that affect ow nation now. He states, "With lirnited resources,
the public health coffinunity needs to set its priorities with care" (p- 709).
Henderson (1998) poses four common points policy makers and citizens have
used to not move forward with preparedness. First, biological weapons have rarely heen
used in the past, and it is likely that they will continue to not be used. Secondly, they are
such an abhorrent weapon that no one would actually use them. Third, the technology to
produce a working weapon is out of reach of rnost laboratories. Finally, they are so
dangerous and deadly that no one could rightly use them. He continues in his article to
discuss how all of these beliefs are false.
Need for preparedness
Is there a need for preparedness? Are hospitals currently able to manage a BT
attack? Whaf*ould happen if hospitals were not prepared? The Minnesota Departrnent
of Health described bioterrorism as "low probability, high consequence" and
..coflsequences of such an attack could be devastating, and thus, there is a need for
preparedness." (Minnesota Departrnentof Health,2001, para- 2). They go on to state that
the best protection from BT is to have "a strong and prepared public health
system..."(para. 8).
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In 1997, the economic irnpact of an attack against a city of 100,000 (assurning
50,000 exposures and 32,875 deaths) was estirnated to be fi26.2 billion for anthrax
(Kaufmann, Meltzer &Schmid, Tg91). The authors concluded that preparedness would
reduce the probability of an attack. Jones, Terndrup, Franz and Eitzen {2002) also
discussed that the ability to detect rapidly and respond adequately to a bioagent could
help deter a terrorist attack.
Henderson (1998, para. 25) expressed his view on the level of preparedness, "'We
are ill-prepared to deal with a terrorist attack that employs biological weapons." He
discussed the need for a standard approach among hospitals in treating victims of BT" He
states that hospital personnel dealing with these patients on the front lines, such as ED
physicians and nurses, need to be familiar with potential agents and their subsequent
isolation and infection control needs. Lack of knowledge can lead to increased mortality
rates, as shown in a Lg72 outhreak in Yugoslavia. There, from one index case of
srnallpox ,175 cases of smallpox and 35 deaths occurred because the diagnosis of
smallpox was missed initially (Henderson, 1998). In a later article, Henderson (1999)
addressed BT preparedness, clairning there are needs for: training of primary care and ED
physicians in early detection of BT agents, training of laboratory personnel for
identification of BT agents and irnproved vaccines in higher quantities.
personnel are not consistently trained in how to respond to victirns of BT attacks.
Between lgg3 and lggg,almost 6000 people in the United States were victims of anthrax
hoaxes. The responses to these threats varied greatly. In some cases, patients were not
treated and were told to go home by scene personnel. In other incidents, people were
made to disrobe and bathe with a bleach solution in portable hazardous rnaterials
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showers. In one case, the level of care varied numerous timesi patients went through two
pre-hospital decontaminations, and a third decontamination at the hospital- At the
hospital, the same patients were sent horne without chemo-prophylactic therapy (Keim &
Kaufrnann, 1999).
Khan et al. (2000) discuss the need for response tirne to be brief, especially with
smallpox. This is due to the small window of time between initial victims and
subsequent secondary victirns from contact with those infected. Early identification of an
attack and what agent was used could mitigate the spread of the disease through
prophylaxis treatments and vaccination. If this does not occur, there could be multiple
waves of infections that could quickly spread worldwide (O'Toole et al., 2002)- Lack of
preparation would lead to the health-care system becoming quickly overwhelmed (Khan
et al., 2000) and virtually ineffective-
In 2000, a large exercise called TOPOFF was conducted, testing governmental
response to a sirnulated bioterrorism attack on the U.S. The results showed that
community hospitals would be unable to respond adequately to such an attack- In the
simulation, hospitals were theoretically understaffed, ran out of supplies and medicine
and were overwhelmed by patient numbers (Inglesby, Grossman & O'Toole, 2000).
In the sufllmer of 2001, a senior level exercise was held to sirnulate a covert
srnallpox attack on the U.S. It was called "Dark'Winter" and was put together by the
Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies along with the Center of
Strategic and International Sfudies, the Analytical Services Institute for Homeland
Security and the Oklatrorna National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism-
It examined senior level policy makers when confronted with a bioweapofls attack. The
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exercise showed that policy rnakers were unfamiliar with the seriousness and possible
consequences of a bio-terrorist attack; that insufficient drug and vaccine supplies (at the
current level) greatly hindered an adequate response; health-care systems were
unprepared to deal with the potential level of casualties; and there were conflicts between
state and federal priorities (O'Toole et al-, 2OOZ)'
What has been studied
What is the current level of preparedness of hospitals? In Minnesota there have
been no published reports on hospital preparedness. Nationally, however, some studies
have been conducred. wetteretal. (2001) studied preparedness in hospitals (N=186) in
four northwestern states. They showed less than TOVy of responding hospitals had plans
in place to deal with victims of biological or chemical attacks. Overall, they found levels
of preparedness low in the areas examined-planning, awareness of staff, training,
supplies and physical resources. Rural hospitals were shown to be less prepared than
urban hospitals in certain survey questions. Urban hospitals were three times more likely
to have BT response plans in place than rural hospitals. Urban hospitals were also more
likely to have decontamination units, appropriate protective equipment, and drugs to treat
chemical attacks. Overall, the study showed rural hospitals were less prepared than
already inadequately prepared urhan hospitals. They concluded that reduction in the loss
of life due to biological terrorisrn would come from preparedness at the local level. This
is the largest, most complete study published to date regarding the level of preparedness
of hospitals. It gives valuable inforrnation on the current state of preparedness of rural
and urban hospitals. This study is the most often cited in discussions about BT
preparedness.
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Case, West and McHugh (2001) surveyed l0 hospitals in central New Jersey.
They showed that 5OTo of laboratories were able to identify smallpox and lOVo could
identify anthrax. Ninety percent of respondents stated that one fifth or 2OTo of their ED
staff had training related to casualties of biological terrorism. AIl hospitals had negative
airflow rooms with special ventilation systems. Sixty-seven percent had protocols to deal
with biological and. chemical terrorism and 80To had conducted at least one drill related to
a bio-weapons attack. Finally, 6OTo of hospitals had chemical protective suits for ED
staff. The sfudy also showed, based on the 10 responses, no statistical differences in
response between rural and urban facilities. Overall they found that hospitals "would be
able to deliver only the basic services to a limited numberof victirns" (p. 31). The design
of this study mirrored the Wetter et al. study of 2001 with some modifications. Because
of the small size of this study it is difficult to draw solid conclusions from its results.
However, the findings are interesting in that they differ from most studies of
preparedness, finding a majority of hospitals having some level of preparedness.
Trear et al. (2001) surveyed 30 (22 rural and 8 urban) hospitals in Federal
Ernergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region III on the east coast of the U.S. The
study was based on a convenience sample of 40 hospitals with interviews of ED staff
investigating their perceived levels of their hospital's preparedness. It showed overall
that hospitals were not prepared to handle events caused by weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). In dealing with large influxes of patients and levels of staff training, hospitals
were found to be inadequate. Overall, only 27Va had incorporated WMD planning into
their hospital disaster plan. Of the 22 ruralhospitals, all responded that they had no
overall level of preparedness for biological terrorism. This study shed some light on the
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problem, but did not represent directly the level of preparedness due its methodology. It
was a convenience stndy asking for the staff's perception of preparedness. This
perception may be positively or negatively affected by rnany factors such as current job
satisfaction or interest in accurately completing the survey. However, it directly surveyed
the people who would rnost likely respond to a BT attack, and they were the people who
needed to be prePared.
Greenburg, Jurgens, and Gracely (2002) studied 62 Philadelphia hospitals.
Almost 67Vo of the responding EDs had written protocols in place for evaluating and
treating victims of bioweapons. Of those surveyed , ?9.6Vo had not conducted fuills
specific to biological and chemical threats and 9.3Vo did not know' if they had. Just over
1l4odid not have protocols for contacting proper authorities in case of a suspected attack
and 61 .lVo did,not have protocols for post-exposure prophylaxis treatment for staff
members exposed to agents. This is a sffong sfudy with thorough methodology- The
study surveyed aspects of preparedness that many authors agree are pertinent.
Chen, Hicker, Fink, Galliher and Burstin (2002) surveyed 976 family physicians
and their perceptions about BT preparedness. Approximately 63Vo of the physicians
responded to the survey. Of the respondents,g5%o felt that BT within the U.S. was a
genuine threat. Less than 17Vo felt that their local health care system could adequately
respond to a BT attack. Eighteen percent had training in BT preparedness and26%o felt
they knew what to do in case of an attack. The authors concluded that more training was
needed for physicians in regard to BT preparedness. This study provided good insight
into the reality of what is believed could be realistically done to respond to a BT attack in
the U.S.
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These studies illustrated that across the U.S., hospitals generally were not
prepared for bioterrorist attacks. wetter et al. (2001) is the most oftcn cited study among
articles regarding BT preparedness. It is often regarded as an accurate portrayal of the
current level of preparedness. Of the studies, only three offer any data regarding
preparedness of rural hospitals. These studies, Wetter et al. (2001), Treat et al. (2001),
and case et al. (2001), all agreed that hospitals, both urban and rural, need to be better
prepared for BT attacks. Case et a1., however, in their sfudy of 10 hospitals, found no
statistical difference between urban and rural New Jersey hospitals in their levels of
preparedness. There may be many reasons for this discrepancy such as higher regional
awareness of BT risks. Conversely, Wetter et al. and Treat et al. both show significantly
lower levels of preparedness of rural hospitals compared to urban.
In all, this review of the current studies illustrates the need for further studies.
There are currently few studies on hospital BT preparedness and fewer that look at
differences between rural and urhan hospitals. The lack of information is more evident in
Minnesota because there are no published studies on this issue.
How prepared should we be?
Currently there is no consensus on what preparedness should include or what a
minimal level of preparedness for healthcare facilities entails. Wetter et al. (2001) define
rninimum preparedness as follows:
1) A hazardous materials or chemical weapons plan; 2) either (a) an ED
indoor area with isolated ventilation and a shower with water
containment or (b) an outdoor portable decontarnination unit; 3) at
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least 1 self-contained breathing apparafus or supplied air-line
respirator; and 4) at least I chemical-protective garment. (p. 2)
Greenburg et al" (Z0AZ) developed a minimurn level of preparedness for biological and
chernical weapons, because no specific criteria had been published at the time- These
criteria included: 1) one or more trained physicians on staff trained in management of
victims of bioweapons, 2) decontamination capabilities 3) written protocols for
evaluation and treatment of casualties 4) written agreements with other agencies for
cooperation 5) participation in drills related to bioweapons attacks 6) appropriate levels
of supplies.
In the Case et al. (2001) sfudy of preparedness in New Jersey hospitals, they
stated that planning should include: training, proper equipment for personnel, care plans
for victims, rnedication and supply stockpiles, and protocols for agent identification' As
part of Michael Osterholm's broader plan for preparedness, he included: creating a usable
stockpile of vaccines and pharmaceuticals, increasing hospitals surge capacity,
strengthening the public health system, clearly defining federal, state and local roles, and
performing real life drills (Osterholm & Schwartz, 2000). Schultz et aL (2002) chose
nine basic components for an adequate response plan to bioterrorism. They are:
..Activation and notification; Facility protection; Decontarnination; Expansion of services
and alternative care sites; Supplies and logistics; Staff education and training; Cornmand
and control; Coordination and communication; Recovery issues" (p. 442). Jones et al.
(ZO1Z,p- 515) state, "...aspects of preparedness include logistic concems such as
infrastnrcture, including hospital beds, quarantine facilities, and stockpiling of
pharmaceuticals and suPPlies."
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The American Hospital Association (AHA) recently made recoffImendations for
hioterrorism preparedness" A key aspect of this was the issue of staffing- The grottp
suggested: the identification of reserve staff, people who are trained but no longer
working in healthcare; advanced jurisdiction agreernents for physicians and nurses letting
thern practice in other areas during emergencies; and plans to support the families of staff
members needed during emergencies (Bentley, 2001).
Local, state and regional resources should be included in the planning process for
each hospital (ApIC, ZA}D. Greenburg et al. (2002 , p. 277) stated that written policies
for evaluation and treatment are essential for "functional preparedness plans." If there is a
large-scale exposure, hospitals should have advanced planning oH how they will triage
and deliver care. This should include: good cofilmunication networks, established
hierarchy of authority, cancellation of non-emergent care, sources for additional supplies,
methods to efficiently evaluate and discharge patients, and discharge instructions for non-
contagious patients (English et al., 2002)-
On a national level for preparedness, the CDC has created five areas of focus for
assistance in dealing with biological weapons: "Preparedness and prevention; detection
and surveillance; diagnosis and characterization of biological and chemical agents;
response; and communication." Each area should incorporate training and research. In
addition, the CDC will support local and state health agencies by providing
.....guidelines, support and technical assistance..." to help create preparedness plans
(Khan et al., 2000, P. 4).
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Areas to studY
Al1 hospitals, including rural hospitals, need to have some ability to recognize and
manage a number of BT victims. Wetter et al. (2001), Case et al. (2001) and Treat et al-
(2001) all looked at the ability to handle a surge of 50 patients. This is an appropriate
number to use as a benchmark for minimum preparedness for rural and urban hospitals
for two reasons. First, if an attack does occur in a rural area, the nurnber of casualties
would potentially be so large as to overwhelm any single hospital in that area- It is not
financially realistic for all hospitals to be fully prepared for hundreds of victims. In that
scenario, local, regional and state facilities will have to be utilized. However, if an attack
occurs in a metropolitan area such as Minneapolis, victims will likely spread out into
rural areas. It is realistic that a few individuals in any rnajor city live in a rural area and
will return to that area whether they know they are sick or not. Taking into account an
average of l0 secondary victims for each index case for smallpox, the capacity for 50
initial patients may be temporarily adequate until further state and federal help is
available.
In reviewing the literature on BT, t0 subdivisions of preparedness stand out as
areas that should be addressed by hospitals. These areas include: patient isolation,
protective rneasures (which includes pharmaceutical stockpiles, vaccines and personal
protective equipment), training, drills, comfirunication, plannin8, Personnel, cornmand,
surveillance and laboratory readiness. The Hospital Assessment Survey for Biological
Emergencies, which was used in this study to gather data, did not include questions that
cover the areas of comrnand, surveillance and laboratory readiness, and therefore, were
not addressed in this Project.
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The need for decontarnination as part of the response to a chemical or biological
attack has been debated. Sorne authors of preparedness studies have included
decontamination capabitities in survey questions. Many authors, however, believe
decontarnination is not an irnportant area of preparedness. Decontarnination in regard to
covert bioweapons is not an issue due to the incubation period of the agents likely to be
used (Osterholm & Schwartz, 2000). The patient may not present to the ED until days
after the attack, at which point decontarnination would not help. In a chernical weapons
attack, imrnediate decontamination would be a key factor because immediate removal of
the agent may reduce morbidity and rnortality. Biological agents that present inhalation
risks have low associated risk from skin or surface contamination; therefore topical
decontamination is of little use. In addition, there is low associated risk with secondary
aerosolization due to removal of contarninated clothing (Keirn & Kaufmann, 1999)' In
guidelines for health care facilities put forth by The Association for Professionals in
Infection Control Bioterrorism Working Group, along with the CDC, decontamination for
people exposed to inhaled agents "in most cases will not be necessary" @nglish et a1.,
?OA?,p. 6). This is in agreement with Henderson, regarding BT agents,
..Decontamination of patients and environment: Not necessary in most cases" (1999, p-
1Zg0). Jones et al. also agreed, "Decontamination is unlikely to be of any significant
value with any of the probable bioterrorist agents" (ZOA2, p. 511). Except for the
potential large volume of patients, the exposure may be dealt with under already existing
hospital disaster protocols (Schul tz et aI., 20OZ). Because the need for biological
decontamination capabilities is doubted, it was not included in this study as an area of
preparedness.
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Biological agents have been used as weapons for hundreds of years, however, it is
only recently that BT has hecome an issue that the U.S. is heing forced to deal with.
There is no agreement on the best way to prepare for the threat of BT, but rnany experts
agree that the U.S. and it's health care system should he as prepared as possible. Much of
the research that has been conducted on BT preparedness shows that the health care
system in the U.S. is not adequately prepared. These studies suggest areas of
improvement such as training and adequate pharmaceutical supplies. Currently there is
limited inforrnation and little agreement on the best way to confront the issue of BT
preparedness, but it is clear that more research and inforrnation are needed to help deal
with this issue.
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Chapter Three: Methodology
This study compared the current levels of preparedness for biological terrorism in rural
hospitals versus urban hospitals in Minnesota. Rural hospitals are described as being within
counties that have a population less than 50,000 and urban hospitals are within counties that have
populations over 50,000.
Description of methodologY used
The goal of this study was to discover if rural hospitals and urban hospitals were equally
prepared for a bioterrorist attack. This was done through a quantitative descriptive approach that
utilized a yes/no/partial survey to gather data. The responses to the survey used descrihed the
current level of preparedness in a cross-sectional manner. During 20A2, the Minnesota
Department of Health commissioned a survey of atl hospitals in Minnesota regarding their
current level of preparedness for bioterrorist attacks. The survey was titled: Hospital Assessment
Survey for Biological Emergencies (Appendix A). The responses to this survey were used
because there have been no other regional studies published regarding Minnesota preparedness
and there is no consensus on an accurate tool for preparedness assessment. A new survey was
not be conducted by this author, per the request of the Minnesota Department of Health.
Responses to the Hospital Assessment Survey for Biological Emergencies by rural hospitals in
counties with a population under 50,000 were compared to the responses of urban hospitals in
counties with populations over 50,000. This sfudy was submitted to the Augsburg College
Institutional Review Board and was approved (Appendix B). The following seven specific areas
were studied: isolation, protective measures (includes: pharmaceuticals, vaccines and personal
protective equipment), staff training, facility drills, coflrmunication, personnel managernent and
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planning. Each area of preparedness listed above was addressed through a number of questions
within the surveY.
Design of the studY
A request was mailed to the administrators of pre-selected hospitals, asking for a copy of
their responses to the Hospital Assessru ent Survey for Biological Emergencies. This survey was
generated by the Minnesota Hospital and Healthcare Partnership for the Minnesota Department
of Health (MDH) and was adrninistered between May and August of 2002. The survey included
46 yes/no questions and two open ended questions that allowed for written qualitative responses.
These questions covered topics t}rat coutd be put into the seven categories previously listed. In
addition, the survey included questions that addressed the needs of special populations, essential
goods and services, crisis counseling and emergency transport. These areas were also compared
for rural versus urban hospitals looking for differences, but were not focused on in this study
because they were not deerned vital in the review of literature'
The names and addresses of hospital adminisffators were public information and were
available through the MDH web page at: www-.health.stale.mn.ps/divsifpL/.directary/
showprovideroutput.cfm. Requests for survey responses (Appendix C) were mailed to hospital
administrators at their listed address. With each request, a self-addressed stamped envelope was
enclosed for the return of each suruey response. If there was no response from a hospital within
two weeks, a second request was sent to the hospitat administrator. If hospitals did not respond
within two weeks of the second request, they were considered a non-participating hospital and
were removed from the study. Return envelopes frorn participating hospitals were coded to ffack
hospitals that had responded. Each survey response received was separated frorn its coded
envelope and filed anonymously with all survey responses received- Rural and urban facilities
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were kept separate using the envelope codes, After the allotted time for responses to be received
had expired, results from the received surveys were entered into the Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) prograrn and analyzed.
Sample and PoPulation
The population studied included aLl142 hospitals in Minnesota. This population can
further be broken down into sub-populations of 88 rural hospitals and 54 urban hospitals. The
names and location of each hospital were available at the MDH website at:
wl*r'u,.health,stat_e.rnn,usioep/dac.slhospitals.prl-f". The sample populations surveyed were frorn
four different regions in Minnesota. The Minnesota Department of Health defined these regions
for their Hospital Bioterrorism Preparedness Program (HBPP). In the HBPP program, the state
is divided into eight regions with an average of 17 hospitals per region. The Central region and
the Northeast region were chosen because they both have approximately 50To rural and 507o
urban hospitals. ln addition, the Metro region, which has all urban hospitals, and the Southwest
region, which has all rural hospitals were also chosen. Data was gathered for this project by
requesting survey responses from all hospitals in the above listed four regions: 2l in the Central,
17 in the Northeast, 28 in the Metro and 24 n the Southwest (sample size = 90). Rural counties
were defined as those with fewer than 50,000 people and urban counties as those with more than
50,000 people. This number is based in part on the U.S. Census definition of a rural area (U.S.
Census Bureau, (n.d.), Definitions and Glossary, retrievedil2Sl}003). Counties were chosen to
define an area because they have pre-existing borders and many rural counties have only one
hospital in each countY.
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Instrumentation
The Hospital Assessment Survey for Biological Emergencies (Appendix A) was used to
gather data from each hospital. This survey was cortmissioned by the Minnesota Departrnent of
Health in 2002 and was conducted from May through August of 2AO? (Minnesota Department of
Health, 2002). The Hosp ital Assessment Survey for Biological Emergencies was already
conducted, therefore it was not sent to hospitals again. For the present study, hospitals were
asked to send a copy of their responses to the survey, therefore the data gathered was secondary
data. The Minnesota Department of Health had instructed this author in writing to gather data in
this manner.
Data collection arud analYsis
Survey responses were mailed to this author by each hospital. Survey responses that
were received were collected and the data was entered into the Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences (SpSS). Using SPSS, descriptive statistics were utilized to analyze the data, looking for
frequencies and percentages to the questions asked in each category. For statistical analysis,
seven separate subscales were created, one for each general area of preparedness (isolation,
protective measures, staff training, facility drills, courmunication, personnel management and
planning). These subscales provided a natural comparison of rural versus urban hospitals in
regards to these specific areas. Each of the subscales was based on the responses to the survey
for questions pertaining to that area of preparedness. The number of affirmative responses in
each of the seven preparedness areas, as well as the total of the responses were comparcd for
rural and urban hospitals, looking for differences between them. The possible responses were
no, partial or yes for each question, and they were given weighted values for one-Way AN0VA
analysis (no 
- 
0, partial 
- 
l, and ]es = 2). A "yes" response to a question was considered a
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positive indicator of preparedness and a "no" response was considered a negative indicator.
ANOVA analysis was conducted to measure if there was a statistical difference between rural
and grban facilities in each of the seven areas of preparedness as well as a total, with all seven
areas cornbined. The level of statistical significance of 0.05 was utilized in this study to remain
consistent with past studies such as Wetter et al. (2001). The weight of the analysis varied
between the seven groups because each of the seven groups had a different nurnber of questions
that were asked in regards to that area of preparedness. Isolation had two questions, protective
measures had four questions, training had two questions, drills had one question, cotrununication
had 3 questions, personnel managernent had 5 questions and planning had 11 questions, with a
total of 28 questions being analyzed. This analysis assurned that the importance of each question
in regards to preparedness was equal. The goal of this snrdy was to describe the differences
between rural and urban hospitals in their level of preparedness for BT. The present study did
not assess whether Minnesota hospitals were or were not prepared for BT-
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Chapter Four: Results
This study examined the differences in the level of preparedness for biological terrorisrn
in rnral versus urban hospitals in Minnesota. Hospital responses to the Hospital Assessment
Survey for Biological Emergencies, conducted by the Minnesota Department of Health in2002,
were analyzed.
Ninety Minnesota hospitals were asked to send their results to the above-mentioned
survey to this author. From this population, 32 hospitals participated in this sfudy by submitting
their survey responses (response rate = 35 .6Vo). Within this responding subpopulation, 16 were
urban hospitals and 16 were rural hospitals. Seven areas of preparedness were the focus for the
present study. These areas included isolation, protective measures (pharmaceuticals, vaccines
and personal protective equipment), staff training, facility drills, comrnunication, personnel
managernent and P1anning.
Isolation questions involved a facility's plan to isolate and quarantine patients with
coflununicable diseases, and their ability to place patients in negative airflow rooms for isolation.
Figure 1: Hospitals Responding feg/Partial to Questions
- Regarding Isolation
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In rural facilities , EB.BTI responded that their plan called for the isolation and quarantine of
patients, and 43.8 Vo had negative airflow rooms. In metropolitan facilities ,68.8Vo were able to
isolate and quarantine patients according to their plan and 68.8Vo had negative airflow rooms.
See figure 1.
Hospitals were asked if their facility's pharrnaceutical needs had been identified, and
whether pharmaceuticals for biological emergencies had been obtained or were planned to be
obtained. Eighty one point three percent of rural and 68.87o of urban hospitals stated that they
had identified their pharrnaceutical needs. Regarding the pharrnaceuticals had been obtained or
planned to be, 56.37o of rural hospitals said yes and 625Vo of urban hospitals saidyes.
The availability of vaccines, prophylactic treatment and personal protective equipment in
regards to personal protection of staff was asked. For responding rural facilities ,37 -6To stated
they were prepared to give prophylaxis or vaccinations if there were a bioterrorist attack. In
urban facilities ,Sovo had this capability. Personal protective equipment such as personal
respirators was available to clinicians in 75.l%o ofrural hospitals and 68.87o of urban hospitals'
See figurc 2.
Hospitals were asked about the training of their staff. In rural hospitals,62-5Vo stated that
they had trained their staff in the recognition and reporting of possible bioterrorism agents, and
gl.Z7oof urban hospitals stated they had trained their staff in this manner- Diagnostic and
treatment protocols were available to staff in9lJTo of rural hospitals and 93-77o of urban
hospitals.
Drills and exercises related to bioterrorism where part of facilities bioterrorism plan in
56.2?o of rural facilities and 81 .2To ofurban hospitals. See figure 3.
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Figure 2: Hospitals Responding YeslPartial to Questions
Regarding Pharmaceutical Needs
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Hospitals were asked about their comrnunication policies and procedures. When asked if
there were procedures in place for reporting information to local, state and federal authorities;
g7 
.5Vo of rural facilities responded yes; L\AVo of urban facilities responded yes- Ninety three
point seven Vo ofrural hospitals stated that they had ernergency and back-up emergency
corrmunication plans in place, and 93.7 To of urban facilities stated they had these plans in place'
In regards to public information procedures, 62.5 To of rural stated that they had addressed this
issue, and g1 .ZVo ofurtan hospitals had addressed this issue. See figure 4.
Figure 4: Hospitals Responding les{Partial to Questions
Regarding Communication Plans
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Hospitals were asked if they had made plans to address personnel needs during a
biological incident. In rural facilities:62.5Vo had plans for exta physicians;62.57o had plans for
additional nurses;514ohad plans for more EMS personnel. In urban facilities 757o had plans
for extra physicians;757o had plans for additional nurses;37.57o had plans for more EMS
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personnel. When asked whether hospitals have made plans for credentialing additional clinicians
that do not work at they facility, 3L.TVo of rural hospitals replied yes;75Vo of urban hospitals
replied yes. Regarding the supervision of clinicians that do not normally work at their facility;
Lg.jTo of rural facilities stated that they had plans that accounted for this; 68,77o of urban
facilities had plans in place. See figure 5.
Figure 5: Ilospitals Responding Yes/Partial to Questions
-Regarding Presonnel Needs
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The most detailed questioning in the survey, involved hospital planning for bioterrorism-
Of rural hospital s, 6B3Vo had a bioterrorism plan, where 87 ,5Vo of urban hospitals had a
bioterrorism plan. When asked whether facilities were prepared to perform initial assessment
and ffeatment of BT victims, 81.?To of rural hospitals said yes and 81 .2To ofurban hospitals said
yes. Did the hospital's plan allow for the hospitalization of victims of a biological attack;56-3Vo
of rural hospitals said yes and 8l.3Vo of urban hospitals said yes. Did the facility's planning call
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for the reconfiguration of hospital space to treat large numbers of casualties; 68-'7Vo of rural
hospitals said yes; 37.5 Vo ofurban hospitals said yes. See figure 6" When asked if facilities were
involved in community health planning for bioterrorism vaccination and prophylaxis; 56.2To of
rural hospitals said yes; 8?.5 Vo ofurban hospitals said yes. Were facilities prepared to provide
essential goods and services like food and water;87.57o of rural hospitals said yes; 1007o of
urban hospitals said yes. Hospitals were asked if there were plans for the use of non-hospital
facilities for shelter and treatment of rnass casualties if facilities are overwhelmed; 56.?To of
rural hospitats said yes; 81 .27o ofurban hospitals said yes. Did facilities have plans for the
storage/transfer of bodies during a BT event; 43.7 To of rural hospitals said yes;25Vo of urban
hospitals said yes. When asked if plans were prepared for facility security and crowd control;
6g.j7o of rural hospitals said yes;93.7Vo ofurban hospitals said yes. Were plans developed for
patient evacuation and housing in case of a BT event; 62.5Vo of rural hospitats said yes; 8?.5Vo of'
urban hospitals said yes. Were there plans for overcrowding and hospital diversion; 56.2Vo af
rural hospitals said yes; 8l.2%o of urban hospitals said yes- See figure7 -
Figure 6: Ilospitals Resporrdiog Yes/Partial to Questions
Regarding Planning
100
90
EO
70
50
Ssotic)trr 40
30
20
10
r Rural
ElJrban
o
As*ssrnentlfrerhnent
Initial
Capabilities
Plan for htient
Ilospitellzation
Reconfiguratlon of
SPace
Communit5r
Yaccinetlon PImBloterrorisrr Plarr
Bioterrorisrn PreParedness 50
Figure 7: Hospitals Respondi"g Yes/Partial to Questions
- Regarding Planning
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The results of the One-way ANOVA analysis are presented in Table 1- As shown in the
table, the only area of preparedness that demonstrated a statistical difference between rural and
urban facilities was the area of facility drilIs, where rural hospitals showed a lower level of
preparedness than urban hospitals (F (1,30) _ 5.581, p = 0'025). In all other areas, including
isolation, protective measures, staff training, communication, personnel management, and
planning, there was no statistical difference between rural and urban hospitals. In addition, when
totaled and al1 areas of preparedness were considered, there was no statistical difference between
rural and urban hospitals (F (1,30) - L-215,p -0'279)'
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Table 1.
Subscales df F P-value
Isolation ( 1 ,30) 1.497 0.231
Protective Measures ( 1,30) 0.004 0"951
Staff Training ( 1 ,30) 0.1 18 o.t33
Facility Drills ( 1,30) 5.581 0.025
Communication (1,30) 0.848 0.364
Personnel Management ( 1 ,30) 1.s56 0.222
Planning ( 1 ,30) 1.000 0.325
Total (1,30) l.zts 0.297
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Chapter Five: Discussion
Implications
Within this study, the level of preparedness for bioterrorism within rural and urban
Minnesota hospitals was examined. Currently there is timited research studying the level of
preparedness of hospitals nationally and regionally. Of the rnajor published reports, only three
examined to some degree, differences between mral and urban hospitals and their level of
preparedness. The most often cited report is Wetter et al. (2001), which showed that in general,
rural hospitals were less prepared than urban hospitals (N=186). Treat et al. (2001) mirrored
these findings in their study of east coast hospitals (N=30), showing that urban hospitals were
more prepared for a BT attack when compared to rural hospitals. In a limited study of New
Jersey hospitals (N=10), Case et al. (2001) differed, finding no difference between rural and
urban hospitals. The results from Minnesota hospitals within the present shrdy are in accordance
with Case et al., showing no statistical difference overall in the level of preparedness of rural and
urban hospitals in Minnesota" When the sevefl areas of preparedness were exarnined separately,
only the area of facility dritts showed a statistically significant difference between rural and
urban hospitals. Alt other areas, including isolation, protective rneasures, staff training,
coil'nunication, personnel management and planning, there was no significant difference found'
There could be many reasons for this particular disparity befween mral and urban
hospitals. All hospitals a-re required to conduct regular drills, but not specifically for a BT attack'
Rural hospitals may not consider a BT attack an imrninent threat in their region, therefore other
types of drills may take precedence. In general, there may be less concern in a rural setting about
BT, therefore it is a lower priority to focus already limited resources on. The opposite may be
true in the urban setting. Urban hospitals may feel they rnust focus more on BT preparation.
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Conducting full-scale drills may also show a more advanced over-all level of preparedness. In
order to conduct an effective drill, rnuch of the planning and preparation for a BT attack must
already be in place. It is one thing to have plans on paper, but another to have procedures fully
in place and supplies on hand. Drills are a final step in preparation and the inability to conduct
drills may indicate a lower over-all level of preparedness in rural hospitals. It is difficult to fuIly
understand this however, because there is currently no bench-mark to decide whether a hospital
is or is not truly prepared for a BT attack. This study did not look at whether or not hospitals in
Minnesota were considered prepared because of the lack of an effective standard. With the
inforrnation available within this study, it can only be speculated as to how prepared hospitals are
and why there are differences in drills and how significant these differences tmly are. Looking
at the data, however, illustrates the need for greater preparedness in both rural and urban
hospitals. Both settings demonstrate rnany basic areas where improvement is needed, such as
obtaining pharmaceutical stockpiles and vaccines, personnel augmentation, and overall planning'
Limitations
This study was limited to the number of facilities that returned the requested information.
It is not a true population study because all hospitals in Minnesota were not asked to participate'
The study is also limited by the questions and categories covered in the original surveY, the
Hospital Assessment Survey for Biological Emergencies. The original survey may not have
adequately covered all areas of preparedness, nor allowed accurate response options to reflect
current preparedness levels. In addition, this study assumed that the persoil/persons who
completed the original survey had adequate knowledge of the facility and were able to accurately
describe the facilities capabilities and limitations. It also assumed that the original surveys were
filled out truthfully, reflecting the facilities current level of preparedness and not it's projected
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Ievel. Reporting bias of respondents may have caused a higher or lower level of preparedness to
be reported than what was actually in place'
Within the statistical analysis, it was necessary to assume that all of the individual
questions analyzed had equal weight in regard to level of preparedness. This may not be the case
in reality. For example, it was assumed that whether or not a hospital had a BT plan was equally
weighted as whether a hospital had adequate facilities for body storage. This was done out of
statistical necessity and the lirnitations present in the design of the survey questions. The final
analysis was limited by the response options in the original survey of no, yes and partial. A
response of partial is undefined, and it is unclear what level of preparedness this correlates to'
For statistical analysis, the responses of no,yes and partial were weighted as described in Data
collection and analysison page 41. The undefined level of partial creates some ambiguity in the
statistical analysis, which was unavoidable based on the original survey.
Discussion
The present study showed no statistical difference between rural and urban hospitals for a
BT event. This does not imply that they are adequately prepared. There has been a great deal of
work done by all of the hospitals within Minnesota to rneet the current needs for BT
preparedness. There are limited resources available and many hospitals are doing everything that
is possible to become adequately prepared. It is encouraging to see that rural facilities are not
lagging behind urban hospitals, even though there rnay be a higher perceived need in urban
hospitals. Even though it was not the focus of this study, it is evident that there is still a great
need to increase the overall level of preparedness in all Minnesota hospitals. There are varying
opinions on this subject and currently no consensus on the 'oright" way to do things. However, it
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is clear that the problerns cannot be ignored and some level of preparedness needs to be
maintained in all hospitals.
Recommendations
In reviewing literature for this sfudy, it becarne evident that an important initial step is to
create an agreed upon bench-rnark or set of standards that describes a rninirnal level of
preparedness. Currently there is no such bench-mark. This has left the topic open for
controversy and criticism from many different parties. An independent comrnission of
bioterrorism preparedness experts should be instifuted to create an initial minimum level of
preparedness that could and should be further refined in the furure as needed. There has to be a
starting point, and currently there is not one. Once a minimum set of requirements is agreed
upon, there should be a single cornmissioning body either on the federal level or at least on the
state level that has oversight of this issue along with a well-defined set of standards. Feedback
rnechanisms from hospitals also need to be incorporated. Hospitals need to be involved frorn the
ground level on decisions that they will be mandated to abide by'
It also became clear that there needs to be further research into this subject on both a
national and a regional level. Research into the responses of hospitals that have already
experienced sorne type of BT attack should be conducted. An understanding of how they
responded, which procedures worked and which ones did not, would be beneficial to this field.
Additionally, further research into better rnethods for hospitals to respond to attacks is needed-
Are the present protocols and procedures the best and most efficient methods to respond to a BT
attack? Further study into these areas as well as a thorough understanding of the current level of
preparedness would be a valuable next step. The application and further refinement of these
regulations, procedures and protocols will also be needed in the future. The new regulations and
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oversight could be included into already existing governing bodies such as the Minnesota
Departrnent of Health and the Office of Homeland Security. [n addition, although difficult in
the current financial state, there must be adequate funding for these new requirements. Hospitals
are already often running in a deficit mode, ffid do not have additional resources to cover
mandated reforms. Financial assistance from local, state and federal governrnents are needed to
make any changes a realitY.
If this study were conducted again, only yes/no questions would be asked, leaving out
partial as a response option. This would help clarify the statistical importance of the findings.
Additionally, questions regarding only the seven basic areas of minimal preparedness (isolation,
protective measlres, staff training, facility drills, conmunication, personnel management and
planning) would be asked. This could aid in the interpretation of the study and ways to utilize
the information. Finally, a fulI poputation study of all Minnesota hospitals would be conducted.
Conclusions
For hundreds of years, biological agents have been used to fight wars and to terrorize
people. In the U.S., the concern over the use of these agents has greatly increased in the past
decade, It is an issue that no one wants to face, but we currently ale being forced to face it.
There are different views on the best way to deal with this threat, but many agree that hospitals
should be as prepared as possible. Much of the research that has been conducted on BT
preparedness shows that the health care system in the U.S. is not adequately prepared. The
results of the present study show that there is no disparity between rural and urban hospitals. In
one view, this is encouraging. However, these findings do not answer the more important
question of whether the current level is adequate. Even though the focus of this study was not to
describe the level of preparedness, it became clear that more work and increased resources a-re
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greatly needed for hospitals to be even minimally prepared. With the curent overall lack of
information available and the new and pressing nafure of this topic, it is difficult to dictate
exactly what should be done and how it should be done. There is limited information and little
agreement on the best way to confront the issue of BT preparedness, but it is clear that more
research and information are needed to help deal with this issue. There needs to be an agreed
upon standard of minirnal preparedness for hospitals to work towards and the resources for them
to do it. To start to solve the issue of bioterrorism and hospital preparedness, there will need to
be an increased level of involvement, funding and collaboration at local, state and federal levels'
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